Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 27
Issue 1 Issue 1 - March 1994

Article 5

1994

The Hague Evidence Convention: The Need for Guidance on
Procedures and Resolution of Conflicts in Transnational Discovery
John C. Plaster

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John C. Plaster, The Hague Evidence Convention: The Need for Guidance on Procedures and Resolution
of Conflicts in Transnational Discovery, 27 Vanderbilt Law Review 185 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol27/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES

The Hague Evidence Convention: The
Need for Guidance on Procedures and
Resolution of Conflicts in
Transnational Discovery
ABSTRACT
As international commercial disputes become more
common, United States courts increasingly face difficult
issues involved in transnationaldiscovery. Two frequently
encountered issues are choosing whether to use the discovery
procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
Hague Evidence Convention and whether to enforce a
discovery order when the order conflicts with a law of the
state in which discovery is to occur. Although the Supreme
Court has addressed both of these issues, it has left lower
courts considerable discretion to deal with these Issues case
by case. Lower courts, therefore, have not been uniform in
their approaches to these questions, generally evidencing a

bias toward the familiar Federal Rules over the Hague
Convention and employing a wide array of approaches to
conflicts. This Note examines the case law on these two
questions and concludes that the Supreme Court ought to
provide more guidance to the lower courts, in the interest of
providing more certainty and fairness to United States
internationaltradingpartners. The Note advocates a rule that
favors Hague Convention procedures more often and
suggests adoption of the comity analysis of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States for
cases in which foreign law conflicts with discovery orders
issued by United States courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As a true world economy becomes more of a reality, courts
must resolve increasingly common commercial disputes between
international parties efficiently to promote global economic
health.
One obstacle to efficient resolution of international
litigation may be difficulties associated with transnatlonal
discovery. Particularly challenging to United States courts is the
case in which the discovery provisions of the United States
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in conflict with the law of the
foreign state where the information to be discovered Is located. In
this ciricumstance, courts face early on the difficult task of
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determining which transnational discovery procedures should be
employed.
The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters' (Hague Evidence
Convention or Convention) attempts to facilitate discovery
proceedings implicating different legal systems 2 by designating
procedures for obtaining evidence located abroad. 3 A principal
concern of the Convention was ensuring that discovery of
evidence in a foreign state respects that state's laws and
sovereignty while satisfying the discovery needs of the litigants
4
and the courts.
The United States Supreme Court has granted lower courts
broad discretion in determining whether to follow the Hague
Evidence Convention's procedures or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in cases involving transnational discovery.5
Legal
scholars have questioned lower courts' ability to make this
determination reasonably6 and have criticized the Supreme
Court's decision in Societe Nationale Industrieie Afrospatiale v.
7
U.S. District Court, S.D. Iowa (Mrospatlale)
for not giving lower
courts more guidance. In any case, a survey of cases involving
transnational discovery issues indicates that courts have favored
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over Convention procedures
in resolving these issues. 8

Foreign states that threaten criminal liablity for the
production of certain information located within their borders
further complicate transnational discovery.9 As with the question

1.

Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or

Commercial Matters, Mar. 18. 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. The following states were parties to the
Convention as of January 1, 1993: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands. Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1993. at 352.

2.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1. 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
3.
Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: PostArospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAw. 393, 386
(1990).
4.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1. 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
5.
See Born & Hoing, supra note 3. at 406.
6.
Id. at 406-07.
7.
See Societe Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
8.
Born & Hoing, supra note 3. at 403.
9.
See Infra part III; see generally Societe Internationale pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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of whether Convention procedures apply, the Supreme Court has
given lower courts broad discretion and little guidance to
10
determine whether to honor foreign laws blocking discovery.
Courts have used a case by case balancing test in determining
the validity of foreign blocking laws."'
This Note considers which procedures courts should use
when faced with extraterritorial discovery and how courts should
determine when it is appropriate to order discovery that requires
a litigant to violate foreign law.
Section II(A) examines the
discovery procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention. Section
II(B) then discusses the Supreme Court's analysis in Arospatiale
concerning the applicability of the Convention in transnational
discovery matters, and Section II(C) examines Adrospatiale's
impact on the lower courts. Next, Section III(A) examines the
Supreme Court's decision in Societe Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, which
introduced the good faith standard into the conflict of laws
analysis in the context of transnational discovery. 12 Section Ill(B)
discusses the comity analysis suggested by the Second and Third
Restatements of Foreign Relations Law. Section III(C) tracks the
comity analysis employed by the circuit courts to determine
whether to order extraterritorial discovery when compliance
would force the party to violate foreign laws. This Note concludes
that by encouraging courts to use the Hague Convention first and

by providing lower courts with detailed guidance on how to
resolve conflicts of law in transnational discovery cases, the
Supreme Court would enhance the United States' relations with
foreign trading partners and promote the development of a "world
economy."

10. See generally Mrospatale,482 U.S. at 522.
11. See David J. Gerber, InternationalDiscovery After Adrospatlale: The Quest
for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L LAW 521, 551 (1988).
12. Soclete Internatonale,357 U.S. at 201.
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II. EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURE

A. The Hague Evidence Convention
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes two methods of
acquiring extraterritorial evidence:
letters of request' 3 and
inquiries by diplomatic or consular agents or by appointed
commissioners. 14 When using a letter of request, the party
seeking discovery must submit to the court a letter describing the
type of evidence sought.' 5 The court then must give the letter to
the designated "Central Authority" of the state where the evidence
16
is located.
The state of execution applies its own law and procedures in
executing letters of request unless the requesting authority asks
that another procedure be used. 17 The requested procedure,
however, must not conflict with the internal laws or procedures of
the executing state. 18 The executing state must honor the letter
of request unless the request exceeds the authority of its
judiciary, offends its sovereignty, or prejudices its security. 19
Courts criticize the Hague Evidence Convention because
most signatory states' Central Authorities do not anticipate
discovery requests as broad as those typically allowed under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 For example, Article 23 of the

13. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-14.
14. Id. arts. 15-22.
15. Id. art. 3.
16. Id. art. 2. Each signatory state must create a Central Authority to
receive and execute letters of request from the judicial authorities of other
contracting states. Id.
17. Id. art. 9. Article 9 of the Convention provides:
The Judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its
own law as to the methods and procedures to be followed. However, it will
follow a request of the requesting authority that a special method or
procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of
the State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its
internal practice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties.

Id.
18.

Id.

19.

Id. art. 12. Article 12 also prohibits the state of execution from refusing

to execute the letter solely because the state claims exclusive subject matter
Jurisdiction over the action or because the state's internal law does not recognize
the particular right of action. Id.
20. Owen P. Martikan, Note, The Boundaries of the Hague Evidence
Conventlon: Lower Court InterestBalancingAfter the Mrospatiale Decision, 68 TEx.
L. REv. 1003, 1005 (1990).
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Convention allows contracting states to refuse to execute letters

of request seeking pretrial discovery. 2 1 Foreign states' judiciaries
frequently have used Article 23 to refuse to fulfill letters of
request from United States litigants. 2 2
By frustrating the
discovery efforts of litigants Article 23 acts similarly to foreign
"blocking statutes," statutes that forbid, as a matter of law,
23
compliance with United States discovery orders.
Signatory states also may use Article 33 to limit discovery.
Chapter II of the Convention authorizes diplomatic officers,
consular agents, and appointed commissioners to gather evidence

in the contracting state in which they carry out their official
duties or in another state to aid in proceedings that originated in
the state that the agent serves. 24 These extraterritorial discovery
mechanisms address common and civil law conflicts, 25 while
allowing the requesting state to control the evidence gathering
process. 2 6 However, because many signatory states found these
mechanisms to be a greater interference with national sovereignty
than letters of request, Article 33 allows contracting states to
27
exclude Chapter II from their Convention obligations.

21. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. Article 23 states: "A
Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, declare
that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." Id. One
important distinction between civil and common law legal systems is that common
law states generally allow pretrial discovery and civil law states do not. See
Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 35 (N.D.N.Y. 1987)
(discussing effect on -judicial sovereignty" of discovery in civil law states). One
major criticism of the Convention by United States courts has been that all
signatory states are not required to allow pretrial discovery under the Convention.
22. Born & Hoing, supranote 3, at 398.
23. Id. at 398-99 n.12.

24. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, arts. 15-19.
25. See Id., 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
26. Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation,Coercion and the
Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 244 (1986).
27. Id. "A State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession
exclude, in whole or in part the application of the provisions of... chapter II."
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
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B. The United States Supreme Court's Application of the Hague
Evidence Convention in Adrospatiale

1. Lower Court Proceedings
In Adrospatiale,2 8 the Supreme Court considered whether a
federal district court must employ Convention procedures when
foreign states might impose criminal sanctions for compliance
Three individuals brought suit
with the discovery request.
against two corporations wholly owned by the French
government, 2 9 alleging breach of warranty and negligent
30
manufacture and sale of airplanes.
Both sides initially conducted discovery pursuant to the
Upon plaintiffs' second
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 1
request under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules for the production of
documents, the French corporations filed a motion for a
protective order.3 2 The corporations claimed that the Hague
Evidence Convention exclusively governed pretrial discovery
because the requested documents could be found only in a
foreign state. 33 Further, the French corporations argued that
they could not satisfy the discovery request under French penal
law, which prohibited compliance with discovery requests that
34
did not conform to Convention procedures.

28. Societe Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court
for the S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. at 524 (1987).
29. Id. at 522.
30. Id. at 525. Societe Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale and Societe de
Construction d'Avions de Tourisme were in the business of designing and
A "Rallye" plane designed by these corporations
manufacturing airplanes.
crashed in Iowa on August 19. 1980, resulting in the actions brought against
Mrospatiale. Id.

31.

Id.

32. Id, The plaintiffs also requested a set of interrogatories pursuant to Rule
33 and an admission pursuant to Rule 36. Id.
33.

Id. at 525-26.

34.

Id. at 526.

Article 1A of the French Penal Code Law No. 80-538,

provides:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in

writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence
with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in
connection therewith.
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The magistrate denied the French corporations' motion for a
protective order, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the corporations' petition for a writ of mandamus against the

magistrate.3 5 The Eighth Circuit held that the Hague Evidence
Convention did not apply if a district court had jurisdiction over a
foreign litigant despite the fact that the evidence sought was
located within the territory of a Convention signatory.3 6 The
Eighth

Circuit

rejected

the

defendants'

argument

that

international comity required application of the Convention's
procedures first and allowed resort to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure only if the Convention procedures did not succeed.3 7
The court agreed with the magistrate's decision that the French
blocking statute should not prevent discovery under the Federal
38
Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Hague
Evidence Convention was not the exclusive means for discovering
evidence located in a signatory state. 3 9
The Court also
unanimously rejected the plaintiffs' argument that "the
Convention does not apply to discovery sought from a foreign
litigant that is subject to the jurisdiction of an American court."4 0
Finally, the entire Court agreed that an international comity
analysis should be used to determine the Convention's
applicability, but the Court sharply divided on the form this
4
analysis should take. '

The five justice majority4 2 held that lower courts should
apply an international comity analysis on a case by case basis to

Id. at 526 n.6 (quoting French Penal Code Law No. 80-538 art. 1A). This type of
penal law is known as a "blocking statute." See Born & Hoing, supra note 3. at
398-99 n.12.
35. Id. at 528.
36. Id. The French corporations argued that this interpretation of the
applicability of the Convention rendered the entire Convention "meaningless." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 539-40.
40. Id. at 540-41.
41. Id. at 547.
42. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, Joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Justice Blackmun filed
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall. and O'Connor. Id. at 523.
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determine the applicability of the Convention. 4 3 The majority
rejected the petitioners' argument that a comity analysis required
lower courts to use Convention procedures first before allowing
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The
Court declined to adopt such a general rule because it
determined that an individual analysis of a foreign state's
interests provided a better basis for comity analysis than would a
general rule.45 The majority concluded, "A rule of first resort [to
the Hague Evidence Convention] in all cases would therefore be
inconsistent with the overriding interest in the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of litigation in our courts."4 6

The Court acknowledged that the comity analysis approved
in Section 442 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations

Law of the United States4 7 (Third Restatement) might not represent
a consensus of international views on the scope of a federal

district court's power to order discovery in the face of objections
from a foreign state. The majority found Section 442's factors
relevant to a district court's comity analysis, however. 48 The
majority did not provide lower courts with any specific rules to
guide their application of the comity factors and analysis. 4 9
A strong dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the Hague
Evidence Convention's importance.5 0 It voiced concern that lower

43. Id. at 543-44. The Court defined comity as "the spirit of cooperation in
which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws
and interests of other sovereign states." Id. at 543 n.27.
44. Id. at 544.
45. IA. at 542-43. The majority noted, "the concept of international comity
requires in this context a more particularized analysis of the respective interests
of the foreign nation and the requesting nation than petitioners' proposed general
rule would generate." Id.
46. Id.
47. In its opinion, the Court referred to the tentative draft of Section 437,
which became Section 442 in the final draft of the Third Restatement. See Id. at
544 n.28.
48. Id. at 544 n. 28. The factors listed in Section 442 are:
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other
information requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3)
whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the availability
of alternative means of securing the information; (5) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of
the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES § 442(lXc)
(1987) [hereinafter THIRD REsTATEENT].

49. Adrospatale, 482 U.S. at 546.
50.

See Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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courts will resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discovery
rules too quickly, to the detriment of United States foreign
relations interests. 5 ' The dissent also noted that the Executive
and Legislative branches are better suited than the courts to
52
determine the proper procedures for transnational discovery.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's dissent argued that the
lower courts' comity analysis should be based on more definite
53
rules than the majority's ad hoc balancing approach provided.
He endorsed the "first use" rule, opining that "first use" of the
Convention's discovery procedures would best determine the
success of its procedures. 5 4 The dissent encouraged courts to
use the Convention to help avoid foreign perceptions of
unfairness by United States courts which could be of great

political cost to the United States in the future."5

In closing,

Justice Blackmun cautioned lower courts to recognize and
attempt to accommodate the needs of the international
commercial system in determining which discovery method to
use.5 6
He concluded that the Convention, endorsed by the
57
United States, recognized those needs.

51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 552. Justice Blackmun stated:

The Convention embodies the result of the best efforts of the Executive
Branch, in negotiating the treaty, and the Legislative Branch. in ratifying
it, to balance competing national interests. As such, the Convention
represents a political determination--one that, consistent with the
principle of separation of powers, courts should not attempt to secondguess.
Id.
53. Id. at 554.
54. Id. at 567. Justice Blackman noted, however, that he does not favor a
rigid first use rule. For example, if a court determines that using the Convention
would be futile, the court should not be required to use the Convention's
procedures. Id.
55. Id. at 567-68. Blackmun throught that, because of the political,
economic, and military strength of the United States, many states might hesitate
to oppose discovery orders issued by United States courts. This practice over time
could lead to an accumulation of resentment towards the United States that could

eventually cause states not to cooperate with the United States In other matters.
Id. at 568.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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C. Application of Adrospatiale by Lower Courts

After Arospatiale, lower courts continued to adopt a

parochial view of discovery and, therefore, to favor the Federal
58

Rules of Civil Procedure over the Hague Evidence Convention.
Courts generally have found the Convention procedures more
Rules.5 9

time consuming and less efficient than the Federal
The majority of lower court decisions resulted in "first use" of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in transnational discovery
proceedings. 6 0 These decisions show the difficulty lower courts
confront in applying Mrospatiale's ad hoc comity analysis
meaningfully. 6 1 Courts, therefore, fall back on their parochial
bias toward the Federal Rules. For example, in In re Bedford
Computer Corp., 6 2 a bankruptcy court ordered extraterritorial
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because "the
only effect of using the Hague Convention rules would be to
further delay this adversary proceeding." 63 The court noted that
Arospatiale made application of the Hague Evidence Convention
rules an "option" that can be used in place of the Federal Rules
on a case by case basis. 64
In Doster v. Schenk, 65 a district court held that parties
advocating "first use" of Convention procedures bear the burden
of proving that the facts of a particular case warrant employing

See Born & Hoing, supra note 3. at 394.
58
59. See, e.g., In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
60. See Born & Hoing, supra note 3, at 394. Some scholars believe that
Adrospatlale has made it more likely that courts in transnational discovery
proceedings will ignore the Hague Evidence Convention in favor of using the more
familiar Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 406-07.
61. Id. at 406.
62. 114 B.R. 2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
63. Id. at 6. In Bedford Computer, the defendant, Israel Aircraft Industries
Ltd. (IAI), filed a motion for a protective order in response to Bedford Computer
Corporation's motion to compel discovery. IAI is an aerospace company organized
under the laws of Israel, has its principal place of business in Israel, and is

wholly-owned by the government of Israel. IAI based its motion for a protective
order in part on the assertion that discovery should be conducted under the rules
of the Hague Evidence Convention, not under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 5. This statement reflects the court's bias in favor of using the Federal
Rules. It also suggests that the court believed that the Federal Rules provide a default
discovery method that should be employed in transnational discovery proceedings unless
the facts in a particular case warrant the use of Convention procedures.
65. 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991). In Doster, the plaintiffs were employees
of a particle board plant designed and built by Schenk, a German contractor. The
plaintiffs were injured in the course of their employment at the plant and brought
a products liability action against Schenk. Id. at 51.
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those procedures rather than the Federal Rules.6 6 The court
found that by failing to use the discovery conference procedure
available in products liability actions, Schenk lost its right to
argue for the use of the Convention used based on the alleged
burden of the plaintiffs discovery requests. 6 7 Placing the burden

of proof on the party seeking to use Convention procedures
further evidences courts' general preference for using the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.68
Unlike the Bedford Computer court, the Doster court at least
attempted a comity analysis. However, the Doster court failed to
discuss any interests Germany might have had in the application
of the Convention.
Noting its concern that Convention
procedures might involve considerable time and expense, the
court rejected the defendant's assertion of the Convention
procedures' efficiency. 6 9 Thus, this court also showed a bias
against using Convention procedures. 70
Some courts have favored the comity analysis proposed by
Justice Blackmun in his Arospatiale dissent. 7 1 In Hudson v.
Herman Pfauter GmbH & Co., 7 2 a district court held that the
proper method for determining which discovery procedure to use
was Blackmun's three-pronged evaluation considering foreign
interests, United States interests, and the mutual interests of all
states in amicable international relations. 73 The court favored
Justice Blackmun's approach largely because it stressed
consideration of national interests over the concerns of individual

66. Id. at 51. The court's holding followed the earlier decision by the same
court in Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
67. The court noted, "Defendant cannot at the same time frustruate
attempts to simplify discovery and complain about it being burdensome." Doster,
141 F.R.D. at 53.
68. See Born & Hoing, supra note 3, at 401.
69. Doster, 141 F.R.D. at 54.
It has been recognized that use of the Convention procedures in Germany
can involve considerable time and expense.... However, the most notable
aspect under this factor is that West Germany filed an exception to the
Convention procedures for the production of documents and likely will not
execute letters of request for documents.
IL
70. See Id.
71. See, e.g., Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. L. 1992);
In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, 138 F.R.D. 348 (D.Conn. 1991); Hudson v.
Herman Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).

73. Id. at 37 (quoting Societe National Industrielle Afrospatiale v. United
States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. Iowa, 483 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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litigants. 74 The Hudson court's evaluation of Germany's interests
in applying the Hague Evidence Convention differs sharply from
The Hudson court noted that
the Doster court's analysis. 75
United States discovery procedures might be objectionable in
West Germany because these procedures might violate rights
protected by the West German Constitution. 76 Therefore, the
court thought, use of the Convention in this situation would
make it less likely that the United States would offend West
Germany's sovereign interests in discovery proceedings 7because
7
West Germany had consented to Convention procedures.
Although the Hudson court recognized that Hague Evidence
Convention procedures initially might be more expensive and
time consuming than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 8 it
found that these inconveniences did not outweigh the
Convention's overall purposes of facilitating transnational
discovery and promoting comity. 79 The court also opined that as
courts become increasingly familiar with Convention procedures,
80
their use may be as efficient as using the Federal Rules.
Furthermore, the Hudson court noted that discovery under the
Convention was less expensive than Federal Rules discovery
81
because the Convention's procedures permit less discovery.
Therefore, litigants are less likely to be flooded with irrelevant
82
material.

74. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 40.
75. See Id. at 38.
76. Id. at 37-38. The Court stated that "evidence gathering by a private
party from even a willing citizen is especially objectionable to West Germany,
since use of American discovery procedures can violate rights protected by that

nation's constitution." Id.
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 40. -The Hague Convention not only serves the interest of
international comity but also benefits common law countries by facilitating
discovery in civil law jurisdictions without slighting the judicial sovereignty of the
nations in which discovery is sought." Id.
80. Id. at 38. The court suggested that a current obstacle to the effective use
of Convention procedures is the fact that both litigants and courts are less
familiar with Convention procedures than with the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules. Id.

nAmerican' rules are superior to those
81. Id. at 38 n.4. "To assume that the
procedures agreed upon by the signatories of the Hague Convention without first
seeing how effective Convention procedures will be in practice would reflect the
same parochial biases that the Convention was designed to overcome." Id. at 3839.
82. Id. at 39.
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In In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation,83 another district
court expressed its preference for Justice Blackmun's comity
analysis. 8 4
This court, however, applied the Arospatlale
majority's comity analysis because it held that the Supreme
Court's decision setting forth standards for applying the
Convention controlled.8 5
In evaluating France's sovereignty
interests in applying Convention procedures, the Perrier court
noted that France's sovereignty was implicated when discovery
was sought from its citizens within France without the
government's permission. 86 The court also noted that France,
like other civil law states, disfavored the use of discovery
procedures other than the Convention's within its borders. 8 7
Addressing the plaintiffs argument that Convention
procedures were too costly, the court held that efficiency
concerns could not outweigh France's sovereignty interest.8 8
Despite this court's pro-Hague Evidence Convention position, it
found that the party seeking application of the Convention bears
the burden of proving that it should be used. 8 9
Thus, post-Adrospatlale case law clearly shows that courts
have not applied the Adrospatlale majority's comity analysis
uniformly, but instead generally have favored the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure over the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures. 90
Although Convention procedures might be
cumbersome, courts should bear in mind the importance of
fostering international cooperation in judicial matters. 9 1 The
Agrospatiale decision undermined the Convention's goals by

83.

138 F.R.D. 348 (D.Conn 1991).

84. Id. at 354.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 355.
87. Id. at 355. See generally, Bernard H. Oxman. The Choice Between Direct
Discovery and Other Means of ObtainingEvidence Abroad. The Impact of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733 (1983).
88. Perrler, 138 F.R.D. at 354. "Although in theory, learning-curve costs
might make Convention procedures more costly in terms of efficiency, such
inconveniences alone pale beside the importance of respecting France's sovereign
interests and the courts concern for fairness to foreign litigants." Id.
89. Id. This holding followed Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118
F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987). Perrier,138 F.R.D. at 354.
90. In Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992), a New Jersey court noted that lower courts' application of the Adrospatlale
decision has not been uniform. Knight, 615 A.2d at 300. Specifically, the court in
Knight compared the Hudson and Benton Graphics decisions to support its point.
Id. at 300-01.
91. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 568 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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allowing courts, on a case by case basis, to use the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure rather than Convention procedures when
Convention procedures would achieve the same results as the
Federal Rules.

IV.

CONFLICTS OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL DISCOVERY

The federal courts have disagreed whether a United States
court may order a person in a foreign state to act in violation of
that state's laws and to what extent a United States court may
impose sanctions on a litigant who refuses to comply with such
an order. 9 2 The Supreme Court addressed the problems caused
by conflicting
transnational
discovery
laws in Societe
Intemationale pour ParticipationsIndustrieles et Commerciales v.
Rogers93 (Societe Internationale).

A. Societe Internationale's Good Falth Standard
1. Lower Court Proceedings
In Societe Intemationale, the Swiss company I.G. Chemie
sued the United States for the return of property seized during
World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 94 I.G.
Chemie made several motions to be relieved of its duty to produce
banking records on the grounds that disclosure of these records
would violate Swiss economic espionage and banking secrets laws
and expose those responsible for the disclosure to criminal
sanctions. 9 5 The United States then moved under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) for the court to dismiss I.G. Chemie's
complaint because the company failed to comply with the
production order. 96 Before ruling on the governmenfs motion to
dismiss, the district court referred the case to a special master for
findings on the nature of the Swiss blocking laws and on whether

92. See, e.g., United States v. First National Bank (Citibank II), 396 F.2d 897
(2d Cir. 1968); c.f. United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
94. Id. The Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415, as amended, 50
U.S.C. app. § 5(b). sets forth conditions under which an Alien Property Custodian,
acting for the United States, may seize property of a foreign state or national
during a period of war or national emergency of the United States.
95. Societe Internatlonale,357 U.S. at 200.
96. Id.

200

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:185

I.G. Chemie had made a good faith effort to satisfy the court's
97
production order.
The special master concluded that the Swiss government
complied with its laws in imposing a constructive seizure of the
documents that the district court ordered I.G. Chemie to
produce. 9 8 Although the district court affirmed the master's
finding that the company made a good faith effort to satisfy the
production order, the court granted the United States
government's motion to dismiss. 9 9 After the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,' 0 0 the Supreme Court
reversed.101

2. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held that because Swiss law prohibited
the plaintiff from complying with the production order and
because the plaintiff exhibited good faith in attempting to honor
the order, dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was not
justified.' 0 2 In support of this holding, the Court noted that a

litigant's fear of criminal prosecution for complying with an order
is a strong excuse for nonproduction.' 0 3 Although the Court's
holding required foreign litigants to make a maximum effort to
comply with a lower court's production order,10 4 Societe
Intemationale gave lower courts the discretion to apply a case by
case balancing test, based on good faith, to determine when
05
foreign laws may bar production.1

97.
98.

Ia at 201.
Id.

99.

Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 202.
I& at 213.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 211. The court stated, "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal

prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse Is
not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign
sovereign." Id.
104. Id. at205.
105. See Infra part IV.C.4. for discussion of cases adopting the Societe
Internattonalegood faith approach.
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B. Restatements of Foreign Relations Law
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Second Restatement)
sets forth a balancing test to assist courts in solving jurisdictional
conflicts. 0 6
Section 40 of the Second Restatement lists the
following five nonexclusive factors that courts should consider to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts:
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and
nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would

impose upon the person; (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to
take place in the territory of another state; (d)the nationality of the person;
and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably 0be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
7
that state. 1

The Second Restatement's factor analysis continues to be
important because many circuits have used it to resolve
extraterritorial discovery conflicts.' 0 8
Further, the Second
Restatement served as a base for the more sophisticated Third
Restatement approach.10 9
Section 403 of the Third Restatement serves as a threshold
test to determine whether a court may exercise jurisdiction in a
particular matter. 1 10 Section 403 provides that, in the interest of
comity, courts should reasonably limit the exercise of
jurisdiction."' 1 The reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction
should be determined by considering factors including, but not
limited to, the following:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between

106. C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on
ForeignBank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 485 (1992).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 40 (1988) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
108. See Infra parts III.C. 2-3.
109. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403. For a description of relevant
differences between § 40 of the Second Restatement and § 403 of the Third
Restatement, see Infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
110. Sylvia B. Pifiera-VLsquez, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and
InternationalBanking: A Conflict of Interests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 476 (1988);
see THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403 n. 10.
111. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403.

202

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:185

the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect; (c)the character of the activity to be regulated. the
importance of regulation to the regulating state. the extent to which other
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified
expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the'
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with
the traditions of the international system: (g)the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h)the likelihood
1 12
of conflict with regulation of another state.
Section 403(3) provides that even though a court determines that
it may reasonably exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, if

laws between the involved states conflict, then "each state has an
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest
113
in exercising jurisdiction" in light of the Section 403(2) factors.
The Third Restatement's drafters believed that the additional
requirement of examining the foreign law's importance would
1 14
strengthen courts' comity analysis.
Once a court determines that it is "reasonable" to exercise
jurisdiction under Section 403, problems may arise because of
overlapping jurisdiction. 11 5
When more than one state
reasonably may exercise jurisdiction over the same matter, a
litigant may be subject to conflicting mandates issued by the
different states asserting jurisdiction. 1 6 Section 441, pertaining
to foreign state compulsion, 1 17 and Section 442, pertaining to
disclosure requests under United States law, were designed "to

112. Id. § 403(2)(a)-(h).
113. Id. § 403(3).
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as
well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the
relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if

that state's interest is clearly greater.
Id.

114. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
115. See Id. introductory note to ch. IV.
116. See Id.

117. Section 441 protects litigants caught between conflicting commands
when two states have jurisdiction over the same matter by determining preference
between the conflicting exercises of jurisdiction.
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reduce the severity of the dilemma" for persons caught between
states' conflicting mandates.1 1 8
Section 441 describes certain principles of preference that
apply to overlapping jurisdiction in order to protect litigants. 1 19

The major preference is a "territorial preference" which gives the
state in which the relevant conduct is to occur a preference to
exercise its jurisdiction.1 2 0 In some situations, however, this
territorial preference may not apply.
Most commonly, the
territorial preference does not apply when a foreign litigant doing
business in the United States must make disclosures forbidden
by the laws of that party's state. 2 1 Significantly, the litigant may
assert the foreign compulsion defense under Section 441 only
when the litigant would be subject to penal or severe sanctions in
12 2
the state forbidding disclosure.
Section 442 sets forth a two prong test for courts to
determine the appropriateness of issuing and enforcing a
discovery request. First, Section 442(1)(c) lists five factors that a
court should consider to determine whether to order production
of information from documents located abroad:
(1) the
importance of the documents in the litigation; (2) the specificity of
the request; (3) the origin of the information; (4) the alternative
means of obtaining the documents; and (5) the extent to which'
compliance would undermine United States or foreign
interests. I s 3
If a court determines that it is appropriate to order
production and the litigant does not comply with the court's order
because production would violate foreign law, Section 442(2)(b)
instructs the court on when it should enforce its order. It
provides that a court should not impose sanctions on a party for
failing to comply with an order unless the party failed to make a
good faith effort to comply with the court order or acted to
conceal the requested information. 124 A court, however, may

118. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48. introductory note to ch. IV.
119. See Id. §441.
120. Id. § 441 cmt. a.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 441 cmt. c.
123. Id. § 442 (1)(c).
124. Id. § 442(2)(b).- Compare Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Section 442(2)

states:
If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited
by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state in
which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state of
which a prospective witness is a national,

204

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:185

make factual findings adverse to the litigant who fails to produce
documents despite the litigant's good faith effort to produce the
requested documents. 125

The Third Restatement restructured the Second Restatement's

extraterritorial discovery balancing test in several ways. 126 First,
Section 403 of the Third Restatement, initially used by courts to
determine the reasonableness
of asserting jurisdiction,
incorporates factors from the Second Restatement Section 40
balancing test. 12 7
The Third Restatement offers a more
comprehensive and complex set of factors which go further than
those listed in Section 40 of the Second Restatement.'2
The
Third Restatement downplays factor (e) of Section 40 of the Second
Restatement which is "the extent to which enforcement by action
of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance
with the rule prescribed by that state." 12 9 Instead, the Third
Restatement proposes consideration of the likelihood of conflict
13 0
between the laws of the involved states.
Second, the Third Restatement balancing test gives less
weight than the Second Restatement test to hardship incurred by
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the person to
whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort to secure permission
from the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of
contempt, dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to comply with
the order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or
removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort in
accordance with paragraph (a);
(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact
adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production.
even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort
has been unsuccessful.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 442(2).
125. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48,
"

§ 442(2)(c).
126. The Third Restatement states, In contrast to prior § 40, reasonableness
is understood here not as a basis for requiring states to consider moderating their
enforcement of laws that they are authorized to prescribe, but as an essential
element n determining whether, as a matter of international law, the state may
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe." Id. § 403 n. 10.
127. See Id. at § 403; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 40.
128. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403. For example, § 40 lists
the nationality of the person required to produce evidence as a factor in
determining what law will apply in a jurisdictional conflict. Section 403 expands
Section 40's nationality factor to include other connections such as whether a
litigant has a residence in the relevant state or whether the litigant has any
economic connections with that state. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, §
403(b); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 40(d).
129. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 40.
130. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supranote 48, § 403(2)(h)
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the party ordered to produce. 13 1
Section 403 of the Third
Restatement still lists hardship on a litigant as a factor to
consider when determining the reasonableness of the courts'
assertion of jurisdiction.' 3 2
Further, under the Third
Restatement, courts should continue to consider hardship on
litigants when determining whether it is appropriate to enforce a
production order. 3 3a
However, Section 403 gives courts
discretion to consider what role the litigant's hardship should
play in determining whether enforcement actions should be
34
taken.1
C. CircuitCourts'Approachesto Resolving Conflicts

1. Early Second Circuit Cases
After the Supreme Court's 1958 Societe Internationale
decision, the Second Circuit established its own line of precedent
regarding extraterritorial discovery problems caused by the
conflicting laws of involved states.L3 5 In First National City Bank
v. Internal Revenue Service'3 6 (Citibank I), the Second Circuit
carefully analyzed the foreign law in conflict with the United
States court's production order to determine whether to enforce
the production order.' 3 7
In this case, the Internal Revenue
Service subpoenaed documents held in the bank's Panamanian
branch.' 3 8 The bank asked the court to vacate the subpoena
because compliance would require bank personnel to violate
Panamanian constitutional law.' 3 9 The Second Circuit rejected

131. Jones, supra note 106, at 488.
132. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 40(b); THIRD RESTATEMENT,
supra note 48, § 403(d). The Third Restatement states its consideration for
hardship on a litigant as " the existence of Justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation." THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403(d).
133. Jones, supra note 106, at 488.
134. Id. "Not all considerations have the same importance in all situations;

the weight to be given to any particular factor or group of factors depends on the
circumstances." THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 403 cmt. b.
135. See First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service (Citibank I), 271
F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
136. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
137. Cltibankl, 271 F.2d at 619-20.
138. Id. at 618.
139. Id. at 619. The bank argued that requiring production of the bank's

records would cause bank employees to violate Article 29 of the Panamanian
Constitution which provides that "correspondence and other private documents
are inviolable and may not be seized or examined except by provision of a
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Citibank's argument, finding that under the circumstances of the
investigation Panamanian law would allow the ordered
disclosure. 140 Thus, the analysis in Citibank I appropriately may
be labeled a "pure comity" analysis because the court considered
only the consequences the ordered disclosure would have in the
context of the implicated foreign law. 1 4 1 Despite its holding, the
court noted that if the ordered production would have violated
Panamanian law, then the court would not have enforced the
production order.142

Two years later, in 1960, the Second Circuit followed the
same strict comity analysis in Ings v. Ferguson.143 In Ings, the
court found that based on principles of international comity,
United States courts should not take action that would cause a
party to violate a foreign state's laws. 144 The court held that

whether removal of the bank records from Canada was prohibited
was a question of Canadian law that had to be addressed by the
Canadian courts. 14 5
The Second Circuit held that if the
Canadian courts found that disclosure of the requested
documents violated Canadian law, the motion to quash the
14 6
production order should be granted.
In Citibank I and Ings, the Second Circuit's analysis
concentrated on whether the requested disclosure would violate
the laws of the foreign state where the information was located.
The Second Circuit's analysis in these cases conflicted with the
Supreme Court's analysis in Societe Internationale,which implied
that the illegality of ordered discovery in a foreign state would not
14 7
bar United States courts from enforcing the orders.

competent authority and by means of legal formalities."

Id.

The bank also

contended that the required production would cause the bank to violate Articles
88 and 89 of the Panamanian Code of Commerce which ban "any general . . .
examination of the bookkeeping in the offices.., of the merchants." Id. at 620.
140. Id. at 620.
141. See ld. at 618.
142. Id.
143. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960). In Ings, agencies of Canadian banks
located in New York appealed the district court's refusal to quash or limit
subpoenas requiring the agencies to produce bank documents physically located
in Canada. The Second Circuit modified the subpoenas by restricting them to
documents held by the involved agencies in New York. Id. at 150.
144. Id. at 152.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. David E. Teitelbaum, Note, StrictEnforcement of ExtraterritorlalDiscovery,
38 STAN. L. REV. 841. 856 (1986).
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2. CitibankHI
In United States v. First National Bank' 4 8 (Citibank 1), the
Second Circuit departed from the precedent established in
Citibank I and Ings and adopted the Second Restatement's Section
40 balancing test. In Citibank Hf, the Second Circuit considered
whether a litigant may refuse to comply with a subpoena
requiring document production from a foreign state if production
may subject the litigant to civil sanctions in the foreign state. 149
Citibank contended that it should not have to produce the
ordered documents because compliance could subject Citibank to
civil liability under German law. 15 0 The court called for a "careful
balancing of the interests involved." I5 '
The court's analysis
included balancing the national interests of the United States and
Germany as well as the alleged hardships that Citibank would
face if compelled to comply with the order. 1 52 Considering these
factors, the court concluded that the district court could enforce
153
the production order against Citibank.
3. Adoption by Other Circuits of the Second Restatement's
Balancing Test
In United States v. Field,15 4 the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a district court could subpoena a Canadian citizen,
present in the United States to testify before a grand jury even
though this testimony might subject him to criminal liability in
Canada. 1 55 The Fifth Circuit referred to the Second Restatement
Section 40 balancing test, but did not consider all five of its

148. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
In this case, a federal grand jury
investigating antitrust violations served a subponea duces tecum on the bank for
documents located in New York and West Germany. Citibank refused to produce
the documents located in Frankfurt on the grounds that production would subject
Citibank to civil liability and fines. Id.
149. Id. at 898.
150. Id. at 902.
151. Id. at 901.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 902-03. In considering the United States interest in enforcing the
production order the court focused on the grand jury's importance and stated that
it would be very reluctant to allow relevant information to be kept from a grand

Jury. Id.
154. 532 F.2d 404(5th Cir. 1976).
155. Id. In Field, the district court held Field, a Canadian citizen and
managing director of a bank located in the Cayman Islands, in civil contempt for
failing to answer grand jury questions. Id. While in the Miami airport, Field was
served with a subpoena directing him to appear before the grand jury. Id.
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factors. 156 Rather, the court limited its analysis to the first factor
listed in Section 40, balancing only the interests of the states
involved.' 5 7 Under this analysis, the court found that the United
States interest in the grand jury system outweighed the
importance of the Cayman Islands banking secrecy laws.1 5 8
Thus, the Fifth Circuit applied the Section 40 balancing test more
narrowly than the Second Circuit did in Citibank fl, which
considered the states' interests as well as the hardship that the
subpoena's enforcement would inflict on the litigant involved. 15 9
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia (Nova Scotia 1),160 the Eleventh Circuit followed the Field
court's reasoning and likewise applied a narrower Section 40
analysis. The Nova Scotia I court held that because compliance
with the subpoena might cause the defendant bank to violate
Bahamian penal laws, the district court correctly used the Field
balancing test.' 6 1 Like the Fifth Circuit in Field, the Eleventh
Circuit in Nova Scotia I only weighed the interests of the United
States in enforcing the subpoena against the Bahamian
government's interests in enforcing its privacy laws. 16 2 Although
the court found that the United States interest prevailed, it

seemed to reach this conclusion by relying on the Field analysis
rather than by actually inquiring into the importance of the
Bahamian law. 163
In Nova Scotia //,164 the bank was served with another grand

jury'subponea and again refused to comply. 165 The district court
again enforced the subpoena and found the bank in civil

156. See Id.
157. Id. at 405-07. For a discussion of Section 40, see supra notes 106-09
and accompanying text.
158. Field, 532 F.2d at 407. The court emphasized the Importance of the
grand jury: "To the degree that the ability to obtain evidence is crucial to all
criminal justice proceedings, the need for broad authority in the grand jury is
greatest." Id. at 408. Accord United States v. First National Bank (Citlbank II),
396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968.
159. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
160. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691
F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafterNovaScotial].
161. Id. at 1389. In this case, the Bank of Nova Scotia appealed the district
court's finding the bank in civil contempt for failing to comply with a court order
enforcing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 1385. The bank argued that
the subpoena should not have been enforced as a matter of international comity
because compliance would have forced the bank to violate Bahamian law. Id. at
1389.

162. Id. at 1391.
163. See Jones, supranote 106, at 491.
164. In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova Scotia, United States v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (1984) [hereinafter Nova Scotia ll.
165. Id. at 819-20; P~ifera-V~squez, supranote 110, at 483.
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contempt, 166 and the bank appealed the district court's action.1 6 7
The Eleventh Circuit balanced national interests and found that
the United States interest in enforcing drug laws outweighed the
foreign state's interest in banking secrecy laws. 16 8 Unlike the
courts in Field and Nova Scotia I, the court claimed it considered
not only the conflicting national interests involved but also all of
the other factors listed in Section 40 of the Second Restatement,
although the court did not discuss any of the other factors in its
opinion. 16 9 In any case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court acted properly in enforcing the subpoena and
17 0
imposing sanctions.
In United States v. Vetco, 17 1 the Ninth Circuit applied a more
detailed balancing test than the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits applied in Citibank 11, Field, and Nova Scotia 11
respectively. 1 72 Significantly, the Vetco court recognized all five
factors of the Second Restatement Section 40 balancing test and
used each factor to analyze the validity of the district court's
discovery orders and sanctions.' 7 3 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
examined two factors in its balancing test not included in Second
Restatement's Section 40.
First, the court considered the

166. Nova Scotia11, 740 F.2d at 819-20.
167. Id.
168. See Id. at 829.
169. Id. at 829.
170. Id. at 832-33.
171. 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981).
172. In Vetco, the Internal Revenue Service issued summonses requesting
Vetco's financial records and records from its foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 1283.
Vetco refused to comply because compliance would require its employees to
violate Swiss law. Id. In response, the court imposed contempt sanctions. Id.
The Ninth Circuit held that possible criminal liability in Switzerland did not relieve
Vetco of its duty to honor the court's enforcement of the summonses. Id. at 128 182. The Ninth Circuit found that a balancing test favored enforcement of the
summonses and imposition of sanctions. Id.
173. Id. at 1288-90. The court analyzed the vital national interests involved,
the extent of hardship resulting from enforcement, the location of the ordered
conduct, the nationality of the ordered party, and the expectation of compliance,
as set forth in Section 40. The court held that "[ i n assessing the vital national
interests of each of the states, a court ought to consider the degree of difference in
law or policy, and the nationality of the parties affected." Id. at 1289. The court
found that the United States interest in collecting taxes and prosecuting tax fraud
outweighed Switzerland's interests in preserving the secrecy of business
documents because the parties were subsidiaries of United States corporations
and the IRS must keep the information it collects confidential. Id. In addition,
the court was not persuaded that the appellants were in danger from the
conflicting Swiss law because the Swiss Federal Attorney's office said that when
production is pursuant to a United States court's enforcing an IRS summons, the
appellants may have a viable defense to the Swiss law in question. Id.
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importance of the requested documents to the requesting party's
case. 174 Second, the court paid particular attention to whether
another means of compliance existed. 175
The Ninth Circuit did not evaluate whether Vetco made a
good faith effort to fulfill the summons. 1 76 The court held that
Societe Internationale did not control the Vetco decision because
the district court made no finding as to whether Vetco had made
17 7
a good faith effort to comply with the court's order.
In United States v. First National Bank of Chicago,17 8 the
Seventh Circuit also employed the Second Restatement Section 40
balancing test to determine whether the district court had
properly enforced an Internal Revenue Service summons which
17 9
could have subjected the bank to criminal liability in Greece.
The Seventh Circuit balanced the factors listed in Section 40 of
the Second Restatement and reversed the district court's decision
to enforce the summons.' 8 0 The Seventh Circuit paid particular
attention to the nature of the hardship that compelling the action
would have on the bank and its employees. 18 1 Also, the Seventh
Circuit was influenced heavily by the fact that the bank was not a
party to the litigation but only a neutral source of information
that refused to produce the information only to avoid the
82
imposition of criminal penalties on bank employees in Greece. 1

174. Id. The court found that the importance of the documents requested was
a factor that it should analyze in addition to the § 40 factors because if the

requested documents are only cummulative listings of information already
produced then production should not be required. Id. The appellants, however,
made no showing that the documents in question were only cumulative records of
what was produced already. Id.
175. Id. Although the appellants claimed that there were several alternative
means of complying with the production order, the court found that none of the
suggested alternatives constituted a substantially equivalent alternative. Id.
176. Id. at 1287; see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
177. Id.
178. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
179. In this case, the I.R.S. issued a summons to First Chicago requiring the
production of the bank statements of two customers who had accounts with the
bank's branch In Athens, Greece. Id. at 342. It Is important to note that the
result in First Chicago differs from the cases previously discussed in this Note
because the court found that the United States interest in collecting taxes was
outweighed by the other factors the court included in Its balancing test. Id. at
346.
180. Id. at 345-46.
181. Id. at 345. For the bank and its employees in Greece, this hardship
included exposure to criminal liability, possibly imprisonment. Id.
182. Id. at 346. The court wrote, "We think it significant in weighing the
hardship factor that the bank employees who would be exposed to penalty and
First Chicago, which would be ordering its Greek employees to act unlawfully, are
involved only as neutral sources of information and not as taxpayers or adverse
parties in litigation." Id. at 346.
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In United States v. Rubin, I8 3 the Eighth Circuit also adopted
the Section 40 balancing test. In this case, Rubin appealed his
conviction in the district court for securities fraud.1 8 4 Rubin
argued that the district court erred in quashing a subpoena

185
duces tecum served on an officer of a Cayman Islands bank.

As in First Chicago, the court noted that the bank officer, who was
subpoenaed to produce information in violation of Cayman
Islands law, was not a party to the litigation.186 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court's decision quashing the
subpoena. 187
Considering whether courts may order a person to take
action in a foreign state that would subject that person to
criminal prosecution in that state, the D.C. Circuit recognized
that federal courts often have been divided on this issue. In In Re
Sealed Case,'8 8 the court, although not adopting the Section 40
balancing test, discussed several circuit court decisions
employing that analysis. The D.C. Circuit principally based its
reversal of the district court's decision to hold the bank in civil
contempt on the facts that the bank was a third party never
accused of any wrongdoing and that compliance could subject
bank employees to criminal liability in a foreign state. 189
Although it noted the sensitivity of matters when a court compels
a person to comply with discovery that violates the laws of the
state in which the materials are located,' 90 the court upheld the
district court's finding of contempt because the individual no
longer had ties with the foreign state involved. 19 1 Therefore, the

183. 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988).
184. Id. at 1097.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 1102. The court noted, "Rubin is attempting to obtain the records
of Cayman Island residents who are neither the target of a United States criminal
proceeding nor subject to the laws of the United States." Id.
187. Id.

188. 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

This appeal was taken from a district

court's orders compelling a bank, owned by state X, and an individual to respond
to a grand jury subpoena that would cause them to violate the laws of state Y. Id.
at 495. The appellants refused to respond to the subpoena and the district court
found both parties in civil contempt. Id. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's finding that the bank was in contempt, but upheld the court's finding that
the individual was in contempt. Id. at 494. The D.C. Circuit did not reveal the
parties' identities in an effort to maintain the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings which were not complete at the time of the appeal. Id. at 495.
189. Id. at 498.
190. Id. at 498-99. The court noted, "We have little doubt, for example, that
our government and our people would be affronted if a foreign court tried to
compel someone to violate our laws within our borders." Id.
191. Id. at 497.
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court held, he would not be subject to prosecution in that state
19 2
unless he chose to return.
4. The Balancing Approach Coupled with Good Faith

Considerations
Although the circuit courts have adopted the Second
Restatement Section 40 balancing test to determine whether to
enforce discovery orders and impose sanctions on parties
refusing to comply with those orders that violate foreign law, the
circuit courts clearly have not applied the test uniformly. In fact,
as shown by the discussion above, the circuits emphasize
different Section 40 factors, and some circuits include additional
factors in their analysis. Still another circuit has applied the
Second Restatement Section 40 balancing test in conjunction with
the good faith considerations of Societe Internationale.19 3
In In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium,1 94 the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on Societe Internationale as well as the
balancing factors listed in Section 40. In this case, the Rio Algom
Corporation and its president appealed the district court's
decision to hold them in civil contempt for failing to comply with a
discovery order. 19 5 Rio Algom, the plaintiff, argued that it should
not be held in contempt because full compliance with the
subpoena of documents located in its Canadian office would
violate Canadian Uranium Information Securities Regulations.' 9 6
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of
19 7
contempt.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by observing that Societe
Internationalecalls for courts to balance relevant factors on a case
by case basis when a litigant fails to comply with a discovery
order because compliance would subject the litigant to civil or
criminal liability in a foreign state.' 9 8 The court used the Section
40 factors in carrying out its balancing test. 19 9 Additionally, the

192. Id.

193. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium, etc., 563 F.2d 992 (10th
Cir. 1977). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's Societe Intemationale
opinion has had little effect on the circuit courts' decisions involving conflicting
laws in transnational discovery procedures.
194. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
195. Id. at 994.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 992.
198. Id. at 997.
199. Id.
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court noted that Rio Algom diligently produced the materials it

20 0
could produce without violating Canadian law.

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit noted that the district court
apparently did not attempt to balance any of the interests
involved but instead simply reasoned that "the law of the forum
would prevail regardless of the particular facts."2 0 Thus, the
district court's approach clearly did not accord with Societe
Internationale or the Second Restatement, and the Tenth Circuit
was particularly hostile to the district court's reasoning in this
case.
5. Courts Adopting Third Restatement Balancing
The Supreme Court in Mrospatiale suggested that courts
should use the Third Restatement as a guide to comity
analysis.2 0 2 The Court, however, found that the concept of
international comity requires a particularized analysis of the
specific facts involved in each case and therefore that no general
203
rules regarding comity analysis are appropriate.
The Supreme Court's passing endorsement of the Third
Restatement in Arospatlale, however, has not caused the lower
courts to change their comity analysis. Typically, courts continue
to apply the Second Restatement's Section 40 analysis on a case
by case basis without the benefit of any general rules. For
example, in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings Yanagihara,2 0 4 a
district court conducted a comity analysis using Section 40 of the
Second Restatement even after the Third Restatement had been
finalized and endorsed by the Supreme Court.2 0 5 In a footnote,

200. Id. at 998. The district court signed an order declaring that Rio Algom
did not make a good faith effort to comply with the discovery order. Id. The Tenth
Circuit found that the district court's evidentiary finding on this matter was
clearly erroneous and that Rio Algom had, in fact, made a good faith effort to
comply with the order. Id.
201. Id. at 999.
202. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct.
for the S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S, at 533, 544 (1987).
203. Id. at 545-46.
The Court opined: "The exact line between
reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by the trial
court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and interests of the
parties and the governments whose statutes and policies they invoke." Id. at 546.
204. 709 F. Supp. 192 (C.D. Cal 1989).
205. In Yanaglhara,the court ordered a witness before the grand Jury, Shams,
to sign a consent decree giving the government access to his banking records. Id.
at 193. The government sought these records in connection with the investigation
of possible violations of United States tax law by Shams. Id. Shams argued that
he would be in violation of Swiss banking secrecy laws if he signed the consent
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the district court noted that the Restatement had been revised,6
20
but dismissed the revisions as immaterial to the case at hand.
This case illustrates the district courts' general disregard for the
Supreme Court's endorsement of the Third Restatement.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Third Restatement in
Reinsurance Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat.2 07 In this
case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed its First Chicago precedent in
light of the new Third Restatement.20 8 The court found the Third
Restatement balancing test in Section 442 to be "substantially
similar" to the balancing test set forth in Section 40 of the Second
Restatement. Before discussing the new Section 442, the court
applied the Second Restatement Section 40 balancing test to the
facts. Under this analysis, the court paid particular attention to
the vigorous enforcement of Romanian secrecy laws because

these laws showed that Romania

highly valued

"service

secrets."20 9 The court found that the Romanian law at issue was

not designed as a blocking statute to protect Romanian
corporations from foreign discovery requests; rather, the law was
2 10
directed at regulating domestic affairs.
The court noted that Section 442 emphasized different
factors in its comity analysis than Section 40, but thought that
this difference did not alter the court's decision under Section
40.211 The court, however, found that Section 442 made one
important change in the court's comity analysis by including
good
212
faith as a factor that may be used at the court's discretion.

form. Id. The court found that the court ordered discovery did not violate
principles of international comity. I. at 192.
206. Id. at 196.
207. 902 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1990).
208. See id. at 1281. In ReinsuranceCo.. a Romanlan reinsurer appealed the
district court's finding that the company had breached a reinsurance treaty. Id. at
1275. The company sought relief from the court's discovery order which it
claimed would subject its employees to criminal liability in Romania. Id. at 1275.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's judgment against the company but
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to discover the requested information that
was considered "service secrets" under Romanian law. Id. at 1275.
209. Id. at 1280. The court found that Romania "places a high price" on

service secrets. Id.
210. Id. at 1280. Interestingly, before the Seventh Circuit decided this case,
Romania's political structure had changed dramatically such that national secrecy
was no longer so important to the Romanian government. Id. at 1281 n.4.
Because neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant brought this information before
the court, the Seventh Circuit decided the case based on the facts as set forth by

the district court. Id.

211. Id. at 1282.
212. Id. at 1282; see THIRD RESTATEMENT, supranote 48, § 442(2)(a).
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In Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,2 13 the Ninth
Circuit adopted the balancing factors listed in Section 442 of the
Third Restatement, citing the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
Third Restatement in Acrospatiae.2 14 In this case, Timber Falling
Consultants (Timber) won a default judgment against Beijing Ever
Bright (Beijing), a corporation owned by the government of the
People's Republic of China. 2 15
In an effort to execute the
judgment, Timber sought worldwide discovery of Beijing's
assets. 2 16 Beijing refused to comply with the district court's
discovery order, and, accordingly, the district court held Beijing

in contempt and ordered the imposition of discovery sanctions on
the company. 2 17

Beijing argued that compliance with the

discovery order would force it to violate China's secrecy laws and
subject its employees to criminal prosecution. 2 18 The Ninth
Circuit applied the Third Restatement's Section 442 balancing
factors for comity analysis as well as two factors from the Second
Restatement Section 40 test: extent of hardship and expectation
of compliance. 2 19 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
220
discovery order and the imposition of sanctions.

IV. CONCLUSION

Courts have not applied the Supreme Court's Arospatiale
comity analysis uniformly in determining whether Hague
Evidence Convention procedures or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be used in transnational discovery matters.
Although some courts have engaged in a detailed comity analysis
to deteriine the applicability of the Convention in transnational

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1474-75.
Id. at 1471.
Id.
Id.
Id. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit explicitly accepted

Beijing's contention that the People's Republic of China's State Secrets Act
prohibited disclosure of the information in question. Id. at 1474.

219. The court noted that the Third Restatement's list of factors for comity
analysis in Section 442 is not exclusive. Id. at 1475. In addition to the Section
442 factors, the Ninth Circuit considered, "the extent and the nature of the
hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose upon the person ....
[and]

the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state." Id.
(quoting SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 40).

220. Timber Falling, 959 F.2d at 1471.
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discovery matters, other courts turn to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure without undertaking any meaningful comity analysis.
Because many courts face crowded dockets, the lower courts
typically have favored using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which they characterize as more efficient than Hague Convention

procedures.
As some courts have recognized, Convention
procedures could become a more efficient means of conducting
transnational discovery, 22 1 but this will not occur until courts
become familiar with these procedures through use.
The Supreme Court should encourage courts to use Hague
Evidence Convention Procedures, which are designed to foster
cooperation between different legal systems, rather than allowing
courts to defer to the familiar Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The best way to discourage lower courts' reliance on the Federal
Rules is for the Supreme Court to reconsider its Adrospatiale
decision and adopt the "first use" rule set forth in Justice
Blackmun's dissent. Not only does the "first use" rule properly
place emphasis on fostering good relations with our trading
partners, it also provides lower courts with a bright line rule.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could create a presumption in
favor of using Convention procedures, providing that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be used in transnational discovery
without first use of Convention procedures only in special
circumstances.
Similarly, courts have not applied a uniform analysis when
conflicting laws of other states arise in transnational discovery
proceedings. The Supreme Court has provided lower courts with
little guidance for determining how to resolve conflicts of law
arising in the context of transnational discovery. Although most
courts have turned to the Second or Third Restatement's comity
analysis to resolve these conflicts, the courts' analyses have
varied widely. The Supreme Court should provide courts with
more guidance regarding the weight lower courts should place on
the different factors in Third Restatements comity analysis.

By establishing a bright line rule mandating first resort to
Hague Evidence Convention procedures for transnational
discovery and expressly adopting and explaining how lower
courts should apply the Third Restatement's comity analysis, the
Supreme Court could help the United States take a great step
toward improving its relations with foreign trading partners.
These actions would help foreign businesses to predict the costs

221. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hermann Pfanter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33
(N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, 138 F.R.D. 348 (D. Conn.
1991.
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of doing business in the United States more accurately. Further,
they would encourage trade with the United States by providing
foreign firms with certainty that they will be treated fairly in the
United States legal system.
John C. Plaster

